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THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES*

Paul C Szaszt

The United States has traditionally maintained and expressed a concern for human rights throughout the world, although the extent of that
concern and the vigor with which it has been pursued have waxed and
waned, reflecting the priorities and preoccupations of successive Presidents
and Congresses. At present, both the executive and the legislative branches

appear to be at one in considering human rights a major ingredient in for* Text based on a talk delivered by Mr. Szasz to the Cornell International Law Society,
Oct. 13, 1978, and revised for publication with the assistance of the editors of the Cornell
InternationalLaw Journal.

t LL.B. with Specialization in International Affairs 1956, Cornell Law School. The
views expressed herein are purely those of the speaker, and do not necessarily reflect those of
the United Nations, of which he is an official.
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eign policy decisions, and in particular in the allocation of assistance, both
civil and military, to countries throughout the world.' Although this is an
attitude that I, for one, strongly welcome-speaking now not as an international official but as an American citizen and as a lawyer trained in international law-there is an aspect of this development that makes me somewhat
uneasy: the decisions in this ongoing campaign-that is, the choices of actions to be taken-appear to be debated and made entirely in terms of tactics, politics, and even emotional and moral preferences, with scant
attention paid to requirements and precepts of international law that might
have a direct or indirect bearing on these decisions and choices. The Administration, and especially Congress, seem to lack any understanding of
the fact that both intergovernmental relations and human rights are increasingly subject to international legal principles and instruments, whose
provisions should at least be consulted and referred to before deciding upon
a course of action.
In this talk I shall explore two manifestations of this attitude. First, I
shall comment on U.S. attempts to take account of a recipient country's
human rights record as a factor in granting international economic assistance, both multilateral and bilateral. Second, I shall examine the reasons
why, despite its concern about human rights, the United States has compiled such a poor record of participation in international agreements in this
field.
I
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
A.

MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE: THE WORLD BANK

During the past two years, Congress has considered various authorizations and appropriations for capital payments to the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or for replenishing the related
International Development Association (IDA) (together known as the
World Bank). These have been opposed in Congress on the ground that the
World Bank had made loans to countries with bad human rights records.
Therefore, proposals were made to condition further U.S. payments on the
cessation of such loans, or on the establishment by the Bank of a human
rights evaluation procedure similar to that required for U.S. bilateral assist1. For a simple summary of the nonlegal considerations underlying the current U.S. foreign policy in relation to human rights, see U.S. Dep't of State, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, Dep't of State Publication 8959 (1978).
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ance. 2 All these proposals, however, failed to take into account that the

IBRD's Articles of Agreement, an international treaty to which the United
States is a party, specifically provide that:
[t]he Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations
shall be relevant to their decisions .... 3

These Articles also contain an additional prohibition of political considerations, 4 and IDA's Articles of Agreement include the same prohibitions.5

President Robert McNamara of the World Bank therefore bluntly informed the United States that the Bank would be unable to accept capital
subscriptions or contributions made subject to restrictions such as those
proposed in Congress. 6 This gave rise to the possibility that Congress might
decline to authorize any funds at all-a violation of U.S. reciprocal commitments to the other contributors to the World Bank, which had been
carefully negotiated in a number of technically nonbinding, but morally
and politically valid, arrangements. To forestall such a congressional reaction, President Carter undertook to instruct the U.S. Executive Director of

the World Bank to vote against loans to seven countries objectionable to the
United States on several grounds, including their attitudes toward human
rights; 7 Congress itself then included certain milder but still definite directives as to how the United States is to vote in the World Bank on projects

that give rise to human rights objections. 8 These presidential and congres-

sional instructions do, however, present the interesting question whether an

Executive Director who complies with such instructions thereby violates, or
2. In particular, see the two versions of the "Harkin Amendment." 123 CONG. REC.
H3121 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1977) (proposing a new § 601(e) for the bill that became the Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1978 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-148, 91 Stat. 1240); S. CONF. REP. No. 95-363, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (proposing
a new Title VII for the same bill). For the final version, see 22 U.S.C.A. § 262d-I (1979 Repl.).
3.

Openedforsignatureand enteredintoforceDec. 27, 1945, art. IV, sec. 10, 60 Stat. 1440,

T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134. The "World Bank," strictly speaking, means only the
IBRD, but in recent usage the term also includes its two affiliates, IDA and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC).
4. Id, art. III, sec. 5(b).
5. Done Jan. 26, 1960, art. V, secs. 1(g), 6, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439
U.N.T.S. 249.
6. Letter from President McNamara of the World Bank to Secretary of the Treasury
Blumenthal, July 5, 1977, reprintedin Foreign Assistance and RelatedAgencies Appropriations
for 1979: Hearingsbefore a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,House ofRepre-

sentatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 492 (1978).
7. Letter from President Carter to Chairman Long of the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, reprintedin 123 CONG. REc. HI 1203 (daily ed.
Oct. 18, 1977).
8. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 262d(d), (f), -1 (1979 Repl.).
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attempts to induce the Bank to violate, the prohibition against interfering in
the political affairs of any member.
Furthermore, it may be worthwhile to examine whether a vote cast by
an Executive Director on clearly improper grounds-that is, in order to induce the Bank to violate the prohibition against interference in the internal
affairs of a member country-might be considered invalid and thus ineffective. As it happens, the International Court of Justice implicitly addressed
a similar issue in its first two advisory opinions. It held that, although the
Soviet Union's vetoes of the admission of certain states to the United
Nations were legally improper because they were based on grounds not allowed by the Charter, they were still effective to block the admission of
those states. 9
In connection with this question it is also interesting to recall that in
1966-67 the United Nations took strong issue with the Bank's reservation of
its right to make loans to Portugal and South Africa, in spite of a number of
General Assembly resolutions asking the specialized agencies to refrain
from assisting these two countries in any way. 10 At that time, the United
States-of course under a different Administration-supported the Bank's
view that its Articles precluded it from taking account of such "politically"
motivated resolutions.
B. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE
Certain congressional opponents of the international lending institutions have proposed that resources now allocated to multilateral assistance
programs be shifted to bilateral economic aid, over which the United States
could exercise unfettered control."' Surely there can be no objection to a
9. Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United
Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), [1947-48] I.C.J. 57; Advisory Opinion on Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. 4.
10. For a discussion of the Bank's obligation to comply with General Assembly resolutions barring grants of assistance to Portugal and South Africa, see Annex to Consultation with
the InternationalBankfor ReconstructionandDevelopment:Report of the Secretary-General,22

U.N. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda Item 66) 2, U.N. Doc. A/6825 (1967) (exchange of memoranda between the U.N. Secretariat and the IBRD General Counsel, Mar. 3, 1967, May 5,
1967).
11. See, e.g., The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443 (1976) (as
amended). Note in particular § 215 ln(d) ("Human rights and development assistance: Report
to Speaker of the House and Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate" in the Declaration of Policy relating to Development Assistance Authorizations), § 2199() ("Human rights"
as part of the "General provisions and powers" of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation), and § 2304 ("Human rights and security assistance: Observance of human rights as principal goal of foreign policy" in the Declaration of Policy relating to Military Assistance and
Sales). See also CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, HUMAN
E[GN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 1978 (1978).

RIGHTS AND THE U.S.

FOR-
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country conditioning the aid it freely offers to others on adherence to its
own concept of human rights? Or maybe there can be! A number of resolutions passed by international bodies are relevant to this subject:
(1) In 1965 the U.N. General Assembly declared impermissible any
intervention in the domestic affairs of states and endorsed the protection of
their independence and sovereignty:
1. No State has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all otherforms of interference or attempted

threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No Statemay use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtainfrom it the
subordination ofthe exercise ofits sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind ....12

The U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties:
/sjolemnly condemn/edj the threat or use of pressure in any form,
whether military, political, or economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sovereign equality of States and freedom of
consent . .. 3
4
(3) In 1970 the General Assembly incorporated its 1965 declaration'
practically verbatim in the wider Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, under the heading: "The
principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter."' 5
(4) Finally, article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, adopted by the General Assembly in 1974, states that:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order
6 to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.'
(2)

12. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131(XX), Dec. 21,
1965, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1966) (emphasis added).
13. Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the
Conclusion of Treaties, annexedto Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties, para. 1,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/26, reproducedin UnitedNations Conference on the
Law of Treaties, OfficialtRecords, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 l/Add.2 (1971), at 285 (emphasis
added).
14. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
15. G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, at 123, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1971).
16. Art. 32, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Dec. 12, 1974, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, at
55, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
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Now formalists may argue that all these resolutions are mere nonbinding recommendations of the General Assembly.1 7 This may be true of
the resolutions as a whole, and of many of the other principles they proclaim. But I think it can also be asserted that the principle prohibiting economic coercion has become-although perhaps not on the level of the
prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter-a generally accepted principle of international law, binding on all States.
Another irgunient that might be raised is that the term "economic coercion" refers solely to measures such as a restriction of trade relations or a
refusal to grant "most favored nation" treatment, and thus should be considered entirely inapplicable to the granting or withholding of economic,
technical or military assistance. Several responses can be made. One,
which surely would not be accepted by most capital-exporting nations although it is being increasingly urged by developing countries, is that the
granting of economic and technical assistance has in effect become a duty
for those able to do so.' 8 A more cogent response is that the very term
"economic coercion" implies any use of economic power, and cannot be
restricted solely to certain transactions; in particular, it does not refer solely
to those, like trade and communication, that are in any event governed
largely by bilateral or multilateral treaty relations, whose violation would
be objectionable even if the purpose were not coercive. In other words,
acts, such as a failure to grant assistance, that might otherwise be legalbecause they did not violate any treaty obligations-might become illegal if
carried out for an impermissible coercive purpose.
One argument that surely supports the overt withholding of assistance
from notorious violators of human rights is that these rights are no longer
17. For an extensive discussion of this question in relation to the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States as well as to certain other General Assembly resolutions relating to
foreign investments, see Arbitration between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. and Government of Libya (Ren6-Jean Dupuy, Sole Arbitrator), 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1, paras. 80-91, at 27-31 (1977).
18. For various statements of this principle, see the following declarations of the U.N.
General Assembly, which were in most cases adopted by consensus or by overwhelming numerical majorities: Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 22, G.A. Res.
3281(XXIX), Dec. 12, 1974, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975); Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, paras. 4(i), 4(k), G.A.
Res. 3201 (S-VI), May 1, 1974, S-VI U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)
("The new international economic order should be founded on full respect for the following
principles:. . . (i) Extending of assistance to developing countries. . . ; (k) Extension of active
assistance to developing countries by the whole international community, free ofanypolitical
or military considerations"(emphasis added)); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202(S-VI), May 1, 1974, S-VI U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); International Development Strategy for the Second
United Nations Development Decade, paras. 42-47, G.A. Res. 2626(XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, 25
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
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matters of purely domestic concern solely within the sovereign jurisdiction
of a particular state. Rather, at least since the establishment of the United
Nations, they have become considerably internationalized. To bolster this
position it might be pointed out that organs of the United Nations have
frequently disregarded the injunction in article 2(7) of the Charter against
intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," when there has been a serious accusation of a violation of
human rights. 19 In part this internationalization has taken place through
certain provisions of the Charter itself, particularly the preamble and articles 1(3) and 55(c). Largely, however, it has occurred through numerous
declarations, proclamations, and other resolutions emanating from the
General Assembly and from representative organs of other international
organizations, and especially through a whole network of treaties, both
worldwide and regional, in the human rights area.20 But can the United
States, either as a matter of law or of rhetoric, rely on the internationalization of human rights concerns through international treaties, when it has
failed-for reasons to be analyzed in the following section-to become a
party to most of these?
II
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Having discussed some legal questions concerning the attempts by the
United States to impress its own human rights standards on other countries,
it may be interesting to consider the opposite side of the coin: the extent to
which the United States has agreed to subject itself to the emerging international standards of human rights.
A. THE RECORD
On its face, the record is a sorry one. Even though most of the human
rights treaties that have been promulgated by the United Nations or by
organizations associated with it express principles to which this country is
19. For an analysis of the action of various U.N. bodies in this respect, see I REPERTORY
OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTIcE 55, art. 2(7), especially paras. 412-21, at 143-46 (1955); I REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE, SUPPLEMENT No. 1 at 25, art. 2(7), paras. 145-51, at
61-63, (1958); I REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE, SUPPLEMENT No. 2 at 121, art.
2(7), paras. 155-66, at 170-73, (1964); I REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE, SUPPLEMENT No. 3 at 67, art. 2(7), paras. 329-35, at 117-19 (1972).
20. See Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, U.N. Doc.

ST/HR/I/Rev.l (1978), which lists 50 such instruments adopted or promulgated on a worldwide basis, including the 19 referred to in note 21 infra, but does not include the many important regional instruments, such as those concluded among Western European as well as

American nations.
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devoted through its Declaration of Independence and its Constitution, and
even though the United States has usually taken an active, and formerly
often a leading, part in formulating these treaties, it has chosen to commit
itself to only a very few of them.
For example, of nineteen such treaties deposited with the U.N.
2t
Secretary-General, the United States has become a party to only five.
They include the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 2 2 the

1953 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 23 and the 1926
Slavery Convention, 24 its amending Protocol, 25 and its Supplementary
Convention. 26 In addition, the United States has signed five more: the 1948
27
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

to which the Senate has refused to consent for an entire generation; 28 the
1962 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and
Registration of Marriages; 29 the 1966 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 30 the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;3 1 and the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 2 President
Carter signed the last two agreements in October 1977 and submitted the
21. Status of internationalconventions in thefield of human rights in respect of which the
Secretar-Genera/performsdepositaryfunction, U.N. Doc. A/33/143, Aug. 17, 1978, reporting
the signatures and ratifications of and declarations concerning 19 international treaties, as of
June 30, 1978. U.N. Does. A/33/147, A/33/148, and A/33/149, Sept. 19, 1978, provide
slightly more up-to-date and extensive information as to five of these treaties. For a relatively
recently compiled history and analysis of the U.S. reaction to these instruments, see The Ratification of U.N. Human Rights Instruments by the United States, Prepared by the Staff of the
World Peace Through Law Center for the Washington World Law Conference, Oct. 12-17,
1975 [hereinafter cited as Ratification Paper].
22. Done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (U.S. accession, Nov. 1, 1968).
23. Done Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (U.S. accession, Apr. 8, 1976).
24. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, done Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat.
2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, as amended (U.S. accession with reservation, Mar. 21,
1929).
25. Done Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No. 3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51 (U.S. accession,
Mar. 7, 1956).
26. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418,
266 U.N.T.S. 3 (U.S. accession, Dec. 6, 1967).
27. 4dopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
28. For a history of U.S. Senate consideration of the Genocide Convention, see Ratification Paper, supra note 21, at 1-4.
29. Openedfor signatureDec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231 (U.S. signature, Dec. 10, 1962).
30. Openedfarsignature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (U.S. signature, Sept. 28, 1966).
31. Annex to G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (U.S. signature, Oct. 5, 1977).
32. Annex to G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (U.S. signature, Oct. 5, 1977).
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last three to the Senate in early 1978. 3 3 No action at all has been taken on
certain important instruments, such as the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, 34 the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, 35 the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 36 and

the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.37 This record is poorer than that of almost any other Western state,
including Canada and the United Kingdom, whose legal traditions are similar to our own. It is considerably worse than, for example, that of the Soviet Union,38 which thirty years ago was one of eight states that abstained
39
on the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

B.

REASONS FOR LACK OF U.S. PARTICIPATION

It is useful to explore briefly the reasons-good, bad, or doubtful-that
may explain this apparently anomalous U.S. attitude: a strong commitment
to human rights and a desire to express that commitment on a worldwide
basis, coupled with a reluctance to undertake international legal or even
quasi-legal obligations. 4°
Let me start with what may be considered as a good but not really
sufficient reason that relates to several otherwise worthwhile instruments.
33. See Four TreatiesPertainingto Human Rights, SEN. EXEC. Docs. C, D, E, AND F, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (Message from President Carter) [hereinafter cited as Presidential
Message].
34. Done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
35. Done Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
36. Done Aug. 30, 1961, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.9/15 (1961).
37. Annex to G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Optional Protocol].
38. With respect to the 19 instruments referred to in note 21 svupra, the record is:
signed but not ratified
ratified
Canada
0
12
United Kingdom
0
14
U.S.S.R.
0
11
U.S.A.
5
5
39. The vote was 48:0:8. U.N. Doc. A/PV.183 (1948).
40. For example, the United States was not one of the nine countries that had responded
by Oct. 1, 1978, see U.N. Doc. A/33/197 (1978), to the General Assembly's invitation to all
U.N. members, G.A. Res. 32/64, Dec. 8, 1977, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45)137, U.N. Doc.
A/32/45, to reinforce their support of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), Dec. 9, 1975, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1976), by depositing with the Secretary-General a unilateral nonbinding declaration
of intention to comply with the Declaration and to implement it through appropriate measures. Nor was the United States one of the 26 countries that responded to a questionnaire on
the implementation of that Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/33/196, Add.l, Add.2 (1978), that the
Secretary-General had circulated in response to G.A. Res. 32/63, Dec. 8, 1977, 32 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 45) 137, U.N. Doc. A/32/45.
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Several of these treaties contain ancillary provisions that violate fundamental American values and principles. For example, article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination requires all parties to "declare an offence punishable by law
all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination," '4 1 and to recognize participation in organizations that promote and incite racial discrimination "as an offence
punishable by law." 42 Manifestly these reqirements violate the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and obviously the United States could not
agree to them. But it would be possible to make a reservation to this provision, as have many Western states that have become parties to this
Convention 4 3 and to others containing similar restrictions. Naturally, in
signing and submitting this treaty to the Senate, President Carter has recommended such a reservation.4 In other words, for most of the instruments in question, such aberrations are curable by carefully drafted
reservations that would be acceptable under international legal principles
'45
as not "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty."
In contrast, another reason often given for U.S. refusal to become a
party to certain human rights treaties is entirely inadequate: that these
would grant rights greater than those guaranteed by the federal or state
constitutions or legislation. This attitude was most clearly expressed in
what I understand was the original proposal for a general reservation to be
suggested to the Senate in connection with the four human rights treaties
submitted to it in February 1978: this reservation was to negate all provisions that would in any way change existing federal or state laws. Such a
proposal seems to misunderstand the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution4 6 as well as the purpose of treaty making in general and of human
rights treaties in particular. These instruments are designed not merely to
41. Note 30 supra, art. 4(a).
42. Id, art. 4(b).
43. See, for example, the declarations and reservations of Austria, Bahamas, Belgium,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. MultilateralTreatiesin respect of which the Secretary.
GeneralPerforms DefpositaryFunctions, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/12 (1979), 91, 93, 94, 97-

98.
44. For the reservation made upon signature, see id. at 98. For the proposed reservation
on ratification, see Presidential Message, supra note 33, at VII.
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprintedin UnitedNations Conference on the Law ofTreaties, Official

Records,supra note 13, at 291 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. This Convention has
not yet entered into force, though the required 35 ratifications have almost been attained; the
United States signed the Convention on Apr. 24, 1970, but has not yet ratified it. Nevertheless,
the principles it expresses are for the most part accepted as constituting a codification of the
prevailing rules of customary international law.
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.

HUMAN RIGHTS

1979]

maintain the status quo but to raise it, and to do so not only for "lesser
breeds without the Law'

47

but for all countries.

That extreme reservation was rejected-perhaps because of a perceived
conflict with article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-

ties.48 But the presidential message actually sent to the Senate 49 reflects the
same thinking: it proposes a reservation, understanding, or explanatory

statement on every specific point that would change American law in any
way. For example, the President's message declared the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to be, "of the. . . treaties submitted, the
most similar in conception to the United States Constitution and Bill of
Rights."'50 Nevertheless, the message proposed four formal reservations, as
well as four statements, declarations, and understandings, including an omnibus declaration "that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing." 5 1 One illustration of the nitpicking nature of
some of the proposed reservations concerns article 6(5) of the Covenant:
that article would prohibit the execution of persons under the age of eighteen and of pregnant women-not really a drastic restriction, considering
the disordered state of American law on capital punishment. Nevertheless,
the administration proposed that the United States reserve "the right to im-

existing and
pose capital punishment on any person duly convicted under 52

future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment."
Finally, the American aversion to allowing treaties to expand rights
and remedies already available is shown by the President's explicit decision
not to submit to the Senate at this time the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.5 3 Adherence to that Protocol would permit individuals who have exhausted all available domestic remedies, presumably including an attempt
to appeal to the United States Supreme Court, to appeal to the Human
47. R. Kipling, Recessional, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE: DEFINITIVE EDITION 328, at
329 (1940).
48. Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 19(c).
49. Presidential Message, supra note 33.
50. Id at XI.
51. Id at XI-XV, quotation at XV. The same Presidential Message proposes corresponding reservations for the other three treaties to which it refers. Id at VI-XXII.
52. Id at XII.
53. Presidential Message, supra note 33, at XV. Similarly, the President has not recommended ratification of a declaration under Article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, that would assign corresponding powers to
receive individual complaints to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD). The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant does not establish any similar
body or right of petition, but merely provides that the parties submit reports to the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in accordance with a program established by the Council, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 31, arts. 1017; for the reporting procedure established by the Council, see ECOSOC Res. 1988(LX), May
11, 1976, 60 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 11, U.N. Doe. E/5850 (1976).
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Rights Committee established by article 28 of the Covenant-a body that is
already functioning.5 4 At least for the present, therefore, that right is not to
be accorded to Americans.
Other reasons that are given for not participating in these treaties may
be characterized as plausible but weak, or perhaps cowardly. It is no secret
that, in the political organs of the United Nations, the majority of countries
do not necessarily see eye to eye with the United States on certain human
rights issues. To some extent this is also true of the expert treaty organs
established to implement the provisions of some of the treaties already discussed, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 55 and the Human Rights Committee.5 6 It is this political fact that
explains why some of these treaties contain provisions that are manifestly
offensive to such concepts as freedom of speech or of association. The
United States and other Western countries have frequently objected that
some of these organs have practiced a double standard, for example by
57
their chronic preoccupation with the activities of South Africa and Israel
54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 32, art. 28. The
Human Rights Committee (HRC) has three basic functions: (a) To study reports required to
be submitted by the states parties to the Covenant on the implementation of its provisions, id,
art. 40; (b) To consider communications from a party to the Covenant claiming that another
party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant, id, art. 41, provided that both such
parties have made declarations recognizing this competence of the HRC, and provided at least
ten parties have made such declarations; (c) To consider complaints from individuals against a
party to the Covenant, if the party is also a party to the Optional Protocol, supra note 37, arts.
1-5. As of Sept. 1, 1978, six countries had recognized the HRC's competence described in (b)
above, U.N. Doc. A/33/149, Annex I, at note (c) (1978); 19 had become parties to the Optional Protocol, id, Annex III.
55. The 18 experts who comprised CERD in 1978 came from the following countries:
Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Ghana,
Greece, India, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Senegal, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia.
The most recent report of the Committee, including summaries of its consideration of the
reports from 35 states, appears in Report ofthe Committeeon the Eliminationo/RacialDiiscrimination, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18), U.N. Doc. A/33/18 (1978).
56. The 18 experts who comprised HRC in 1978 came from the following countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic), Iran, Mauritius, Norway, Romania, Rwanda, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tunisia, U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. The most recent report of the
Committee, including summaries of its consideration of the reports of 16 states, appears in 33

U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 40), U.N. Doc. A/33/40 (1978). This Committee, which is a "treaty
organ" established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 32,
is not to be confused with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which is a "functional
commission" of ECOSOC and is the organ that largely formulated the Covenant and many
other U.N. human rights instruments.
57. For example, the agenda of the 33d regular session of the U.N. General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/33/25 I/Rev.1 (1978), contained items on "Policies of apartheidof the Government of South Africa," id, Agenda Item 32; "Status of the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of ,Aparlheid,"id,Agenda Item 81(c); "Question of
Palestine: report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People," id, Agenda Item 31; and "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
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and the blind eye they often turn to accusations of massive violations by
other Asian or African states. 58 In the examination of the periodic reports
required of all parties to the Racial Discrimination Convention and the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant, 59 the respective Committees have
tended to accept at face value the anodyne self-congratulatory reports of
states with notoriously poor human rights records, while examining in great
detail and sometimes even with a certain hostility the honestly self-critical
reports of manifestly democratic states.
It is naturally understandable that the United States hesitates to expose
itself to such critical and potentially unfair forums-particularly given the
diversity of its population and the number of disaffected groups and individuals that could take advantage of the propaganda opportunities these
international examinations would offer. But understanding is not agreement, and hesitancy should not lead to permanent abstention. After all,
many other democratic states have decided to become parties to these treaties and thus to invite the criticisms of the supervising organs these treaties
establish-an experience that may of course be valuable for any country.
In return, these states have gained the right to participate in these organs
and to bring their own principles and standards to bear in these international arenas. To my mind, this appears to be the better way to play the
game: to descend to the hurly-burly of sometimes disagreeable political
struggles, rather than to attempt to stay above them as a self-appointed and
exempt umpire unilaterally declaring and imposing decrees. This country's
self-assurance, particularly in the field of human rights, should be sufficient
to counter and answer any unfair criticism of our domestic practices, 60
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories," id,

Agenda Item 55.
58. For example, the serious accusations against Kampuchea (Cambodia) have not come
before the General Assembly in any form, though the Commission on Human Rights did

decide to address some inquiries to that Government. Commission Decision 9 (XXXIV), reprintedin Report ofthe 34th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, 1978 ESCOR,
Supp. (No. 4) 137, U.N. Does. E/1978/34, E/CN.4/1292 (1978). For a short summary of the
discussion of this issue by the Commission, see id, paras. 213-15.
59. For summaries of the consideration of such national reports during 1978, see the re-

ports of the respective committees to the U.N. General Assembly, notes 55-56 supra.
60. The United States regularly submits to ECOSOC periodic reports on national devel-

opments relating to particular aspects of human rights, pursuant to ECOSOC Res. 1596, 50
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 20, U.N. Doc. E/5044 (1971); ECOSOC Res. 1074C, 39 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 24, U.N. Doc. E/4117 (1965), which are examined by the Ad Hoc

Committee on Periodic Reports of the Commission on Human Rights. The following is a list
of the latest such reports: civil and political rights, July 1, 1968-June 30, 1971, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1098/Add.15 (1972); economic, social and cultural rights, July 1, 1969-June 30, 1973,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1155/Add.26 (1974); freedom of information, July 1, 1970-June 30, 1975,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1214/Add.I0 (1976). The United States also contributes accounts on salient developments to the U.N. YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS. See, e.g., [1973-74] Y.B. ON
HUMAN RIGHT 243-47 (United Nations) (1977).
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while perhaps accepting improvements suggested by the experience of other
nations.
In this short survey I have not attempted to take firm positions or to
give any definitive answers. Instead, my objective has been to introduce an
additional dimension-that of public international law-to the consideration of the complex questions involved in implementing on a worldwide
basis our traditional national concern for human rights.

